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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Should this Court continue the firm tradition
of Utah common law that neither a husband or a wife has a
derivative cause of action for loss of spousal consortium
against a negligent party who has caused injury to the other
spouse?

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules or regulations, or other measures whose
interpretation is determinative of the issue presented for
review,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case. The Appellant, Sherrie Hackford
("Wife") sought her own damages for losses consortium

of her

husband, the plaintiff, Greg Hackford ("Husband"), because of
injuries he allegedly sustained in an electrical contact
accident in Naples, Uintah County, Utah involving an electrical
distribution line of the respondent Utah Power & Light Company
("Utah Power") while performing roofing services on behalf of
the respondent Western Petroleum, Inc. ("Western Petroleum").
Before filing an answer, Utah Power filed a Rule 12(b) (6)
motion to dismiss the claims of Sherrie Hackford.

The court

granted that motion based upon this Court's decision in the
case of Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 493 P.2d 985 (1972)
and other Utah authorities.
Statement of Facts, The facts of this case are
still undeveloped; however, there are enough to show the type
of case the plaintiff, Sherrie Hackford claims it to be.
1.

The Husband and Wife both assert that Utah Power

and Light and Western Petroleum were negligent with respect to
the cause of significant painful, disabling and incapacitating
injuries to the Husband which occurred in Naples, Utah.

(R. 3,

4, 6, 7, 8 and 9, <U 5, 11, 13, 16, 17 and 18).
2.

Also, the Husband seeks damages for medical

expenses, loss of earnings and earning capacity, and general
damages for pain and suffering (R. 7 and 9, 1M( 14 and 18,
Claims I and II).
3.

In addition to these, the Wife, as a derivative

of the plaintiff's claims, claims to have lost the cooperation,
services, society, advice, counsel, companionship and conjugal
affection that her Husband would otherwise have been able to
provide because of the allegedly severe and permanent nature of
her Husband's injuries (R. 9, K 21, Claim III).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The respondent Western Petroleum hereby adopts the
summary of arguments and the arguments as set forth in the

brief of respondent Utah Power.

However, Western Petroleum

wishes to expand on those arguments as follows:
It is beyond dispute that Utah has never
recognized the cause of action for loss of consortium.
Consequently, the arguments of appellant, Sherrie Hackford,
that consortium claims remain an integral part of the common
law have no validity with regard to this particular case.
The Utah Married Women's Act, Utah Code Ann. §30-2-4,
(1953 as amended) should be construed so as to satisfy the
legislative objective of placing a husband and wife on equal
footing.

This Court has consistently held that this should be

done by taking away from the husband his derivative cause of
action for injuries sustained by his wife, rather than giving
to the wife a parallel derivative cause of action for injuries
sustained by the husband.
Finally, the wife's argument that Article 1, §11 and
Article 1 §7 of the Utah Constitution prohibit the legislature
from abolishing any common-law litigation right without the
provision of a reasonable alternative has no validity.

This

is so because Utah has never recognized the cause of action for
loss of consortium.

Consequently, Article 1, §11 and Article

1, § 7 have no application to the case at hand.

ARGUMENT

POINT I

UTAH HAS NEVER RECOGNIZED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM.
Only that part of English common law which was not in
conflict with the laws of Utah and that was consistent with the
needs of the people, was adopted under Utah Code Ann. §68-3-1;
at the same time, Utah's Legislature adopted the Married
Women's Act, which gave a wife the power to sue in her own
name, Utah Code Ann. §30-2-4.

Read together, these two

sections of Utah Code Ann, have been held to deny a cause of
action for loss of consortium of either a wife or a husband.
Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 493 P.2d 95 (1972); Madison
v. Deseret Livestock Co., 574 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1978); Tjas
v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979).
Neither does Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution establish a right to recover for loss of consortium.
The Utah court interpreted this section several decades ago in
Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366 (Utah 1915):
The courts have, however, always considered
and treated those provisions, not as
creating new rights, or as giving new remedies where none otherwise are given, but
as placing a limitation upon the Legislature to prevent that branch of the state
government from closing the doors of the
courts against any person who has a legal
right which is enforceable in accordance
with some known remedy. Where no right of

action is given, however, or no remedy
exists, under either the common law or some
statute, those constitutional provisions
create none. . . .
The right and power, as well as the duty,
of creating rights and to provide remedies,
lies with the Legislature, and not with the
courts. Courts can only protect and
enforce existing rights, and they may do
that only in accordance with established
and known remedies.
151 P. at 366-67.
POINT II
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-2-4, SHOULD BE LIBERALLY
CONSTRUED TO EFFECTUATE THE LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVE
OF PLACING A HUSBAND AND WIFE ON EQUAL FOOTING.
Utah's Married Women's Act is a specific derogation
of the common law of England.
591 (Utah 1980).

Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590,

While Stoker focuses on the doctrine of in-

terspousal tort immunity, it is an important case for the
respondent's purposes in that it interprets Utah's Married
Women's Act in conjunction with Article I, Section 11 of the
Utah Constitution.

In validating the Utah Married Women's Act,

the Utah court relied upon Utah Code Ann,, §68-3-2,

which

reads:
The rule of common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the statutes
of this state. The statutes establish the
laws of the state respecting the subjects
to which they relate and their provisions
and all proceedings under them are to be
liberally construed with a view to effect
the objects of the statutes and to promote
justice. Whenever there is any variance
between the rules of equity and the rules
of common law in reference to the same
matter, the rules of equity shall prevail.

This rule of liberal construction of statutes, to
effectuate the objectives of the legislature, has been consistently followed by the Utah Supreme Court. As recently as
early 1983, the Court has stated:
It is also a well-established rule of
statutory construction that statutes and
ordinances "are endowed with a strong presumption of validity; and that they should
not be declared unconstitutional if there
is any reasonable basis upon which they can
be found to come within the constitutional
frame work (sic) . . . "
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1983), citing
Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 807 (1974) (citations omitted).
Earlier, the Utah court looked at the constitutionality of the
Insurance Guaranty Association Act, Utah Code Ann., §31-40-1,
et seg. (1971).

In two other jurisdictions having similar

constitutional provisions, the courts had reached opposite
conclusions as to the constitutionality of those sections.

In

light of that split of decisions, the Utah court stated:
This court makes every reasonable
presumption in favor of constitutionality
and will not nullify a legislative
enactment unless it is clearly and
expressly prohibited by the constitution.
In seeking the correct application of
statutes and consitutional provisions,
this court looks to the circumstances,
which brought them into being, and the
purposes sought to be accomplished.
Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Utah Ins. Guaranty Assn., 564 P.2d
751, 753-54 (Utah 1977) (citation omitted).

The Utah Supreme

Court has also stated that if there is any question as to the
interpretation or effect to be given a statute, or as to the
preference to be given statutes of similar import, it is
appropriate to look to the circumstances of their origin and
their purposef and also to what has been done in acceptance and
practice as to those statutes.
1207, 1208-09 (Utah 1980).

Cannon v. Gardner, 611 P.2d

Recent decisions handed down by the

Utah Supreme Court following the liberal rule of construction
include Board of Education v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030
(1983); State v.

Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005 (1982);

Christensen

v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755 (1982); Parson Asphalt
Products, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397
(1980); Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (1980);
Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044 (1978).
Utah Code Ann., §30-2-4 has repeatedly been interpreted by this Court as to deny a spouse a cause of action for
loss of consortium.

The act did not give a wife a cause of

action for negligent or intentional injuries caused to her
husband. Rather, it took the action that a husband could maintain for injuries caused to his wife and gave it to the wife.
Redress for loss of services to a family as a result of injuries were properly part of the primary injured person's claim
only. Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979); Ellis v.
Hathaway, 493 P.2d 985 (Utah 1972).

For instance, where a wife

is injured and the husband seeks to recover for loss of consortium, the wife, if anybody, should recover the expenses

incurred in connection with her injuries.

The reasonable value

of the services which she was able to perform as a result of
her injuries and which she otherwise would have performed would
be part of her recovery, if any, she is entitled to.
v. Morrin & Sons, 432 P.2d 41, 42 (Utah 1967).

Corbridge

See also, Black

v. United States, 263 F.Supp. 470 (D. Utah 1967).
Therefore, under the liberal construction rule of
statutory interpretation, the Married Women's Act, as it has
been held consistently by the Utah Supreme Court, should be
interpreted as taking away from a husband his derivative cause
of action for injuries sustained by his wife, rather than
giving to the wife a parallel derivative cause of action for
injuries sustained by the husband.
POINT III
NO DUE PROCESS OR EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT APPLIES.
The main thrust of appellant's due process argument
is that the "injury redress" provision of the Utah
Constitution, Article I, Section 11, along with the due process
clause, Article I, Section 7, prohibits the legislature from
abolishing any common-law litigation right without the provision of a reasonable alternative. The response to this argument
centers upon the first point raised earlier: Utah has never
recognized a cause of action for loss of consortium. When Utah
adopted the common law of England, it did so only to the extent
that the common law did not come in conflict with the express

statutory provisions of the Utah Code Ann, Also, as stated
earlier, the Married Women's Act was adopted concurrently with
the common law of England.

Thus, the common-law action for

loss of consortium in the husband was never adopted by Utah.
Due process of law is not denied the appellant because no
common-law right was abolished upon the passage of the Married
Women's Act.

No such right ever existed under Utah law, there-

fore, the legislature could not have abolished it.
Likewise, the main thrust of appellant's equal
protection argument is that Article I, Section 11 of the Utah
Constitution requires that the Utah Court recognize the cause
of action for loss of consortium because an injury has been
sustained by the spouse.

The Wife contends Utah's failure to

allow recovery for loss of consortium is thus a denial of
redress for an injury sustained.

She compares the loss of

consortium suit to suits for wrongful death and alienation of
affections, where Utah recognizes some of the elements of
consortium in determining whether or not a party is liable for
injury to such consortium rights.
Western Petroleum's

response to this argument is

three-fold. First, Article I, Section 11, does not create a new
right in a spouse.
1915).

Brown v. Wightman, 151 P. 366, 367 (Utah

This provision is limited in its scope to guaranteeing

the continued rights of action recognized under the law of the
jurisdiction, and preventing the legislature from curtailing
those recognized-rights.

Article I, Section 11 provides for a

continued enjoyment of certain enumerated rights, rather than a
creation of new substantive rights.
Second, appellant is not denied redress for any injuries suffered because recovery is accomplished in the primary
suit brought by the injured party.

Under Utah law, recovery

for loss of services to a spouse is properly part of the original cause of action brought by the injured party. Morrin,
Tjas, Ellis, supra.

These cases recognize the intertwined

nature of the primary injury and the loss of consortium.

The

court of appeals of Maryland, in denying a wife a separate
cause of action for loss of consortium, stated:
It is because these marital interests are
in reality so interdependent, because
injury to these interests is so essentially
incapable of separate evaluation as to the
husband and wife, that the conception of
the joint action seems to us a fair and
practical judicial development.
Deems v. Western Maryland Railway Co., 231 A.2d 514 (Md. 1967).
In Deems, the court required the wife to be joined as a party
in the original suit brought by the husband in order for her to
recover.

Failure to be joined in such action, precluded the

wife from bringing any subsequent action.

Of the equal pro-

tection cases cited by appellant, beginning with Hitaffer v.
Argonne Co., Inc. , 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. App. 1950), and continuing with Olin v. Illinois Banking Corp., 260 F.Supp. 820 (D.C.
Mich. 1966), Karczuwski v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.Co., 274
F.Supp. 169 (D.C. 111. 1967), Leffler v. Wiley, 239 N.E.2d 235

(Ohio 1968) , and Witney v. Fisher , 417 A.2d 934 (Vermont 1980) ,
the right to sue for loss of consortium was extended to a wife
basically
husband.

because such right was already recognized in a
Denial of the right to sue for loss of consortium was

considered an unreasonable abridgment of a justiciable right to
obtain redress for injuries caused by wrongful acts of another.
A wife's right to recover for injuries suffered was considered
as cut off completely.

Utah, however, cuts off the action for

loss of consortium in both the husband and wife because recovery is considered as already accomplished in a suit by the
primarily-injured party.
Finally, the derivative nature of the loss of consortium suit is distinguishable from other actions which
recognize consortium rights. Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution incorporates the same basic general fundamental
principles as are incorporated in the equal protection clause
of the Federal Constitution.

Under the Utah provision, whether

a statute meets equal protection standards depends in the first
instance upon the objectives of the statute and upon whether
the classifications established provide a reasonable basis for
promoting those objectives.

The classification must rest upon

some difference, which bears a reasonable and just relation to
the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and
can never be made arbitrarily and without any such basis. In
the immediate instance, the objective of the statute in
question was to place husbands and wives on equal footing in

pursuing their respective litigation rights.

The classifi-

cation here would be those spouses suing for loss of consortiumf as compared to spouses suing for wrongful death or
alienation of affection.

Such classification is reasonable

because the action for loss of consortium is a derivative suit;
whereas, the actions for wrongful death and alienation of
affections are primary suits in and of themselves. The individual who is wrongfully deprived of life cannot bring his or
her own suit.

However, a surviving spouse can bring an action

for wrongful death.

Recovery of compensatory damages in a

wrongful death action is designed to compensate the spouse and
heirs of the deceased, rather than to compensate the deceased.
Behrans v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1185
(Utah 1983).

In a suit for alienation of affections, the suing

spouse has suffered an alleged injury; however, the other
spouse has no injury.

In comparison, the spouse suing for loss

of consortium must prove a tort by the defendant committed
against the primarily-injured spouse.

Recovery is derivative

and contingent upon the primary suit. Thus, the test under
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution is met: The
object of the Married Women's Act is reasonable, and the
classification established by the act is reasonable and bears a
just and reasonable relation to the act in respect to which the
classification is proposed.
(Utah May 1, 1984) .

See Malan v. Lewis, No. 17606

CONCLUSION

Western Petroleum respectfully requests that the
order of Judge Conder be affirmed on the basis that Utah does
not recognize such a derivative cause of action on behalf of
the spouse of an injured plaintiff.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

APPENDIX B
Utah Constitutionf Article I, Section 11
All courts shall be open, and every personf for an injury
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel any civil cause to which
he is a party.

APPENDIX C
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24
All laws of a general nature have uniform operation,

